William Garth Seegmiller and Marjorie Seegmiller dba Mademoiselle Beauty Salon v. Al Hunt dba Mademoiselle Coiffures : Defendant-Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1963
William Garth Seegmiller and Marjorie Seegmiller
dba Mademoiselle Beauty Salon v. Al Hunt dba
Mademoiselle Coiffures : Defendant-Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Lionel M. Farr; Phillip V. Christenson; Philip A. Mallinckrodt; Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants;
Wallace R. WOodbury; Attorney for Defendant-Respondent;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Seegmiller v. Hunt, No. 9933 (Utah Supreme Court, 1963).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4305
APR16 1964 
IN THE SUPREME c;,QDRT, 
'· -·- .. - ....... 4J 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
\\' ILL I AM GARTH SEEG- l £ 0 
~liLLER and MARJORIE ~EG- .,- _ \~'/()3 
~liLLER, dba l\1ADEMOISELLE_\ 
BEAU'f\r SALON, or MADEMOI- .-·········--c~-~·;t:-u~~h 
SELLE SALONE OF, BEAU'l'~1 )f -rorno 
Plaintiffs-A ppellan,ts ~ Case No. 
9933 
vs. 




Appeal 'from the Judgment of the 2nd District Court 
for Weber County 
Honorable Charles G. Cowley, Judge 
Lionel F. Farr, Esq. 
574 East 2nd South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Philip V. Christenson, Esq. 
Wallace R. Woodbury, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
711 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
for Christenson, Novak, Paulson & Taylor 
55 East Center Street 
Provo, Utah 
Philip A Mallinckrodt, Esq. 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
S'I\\'I'E)IJ~:N '1, 011, X .1\'l,UltE OF CASE -------- 1 
l)ISI>OSITION lN 'l"'HE LOWER COURT____ 3 
RELIEl1"' SOl;GH'l, ON APPEAI.J .................. 3 
S'f.L-\'fEMEN'l"' OF F AC'fS -----------·····-················· 3 
i \ ltG lT lVIEN T -.---.-------------------.--- .. --- -·· ·-·-··--.- -- ----···. --- 7 
I 
B\"" REASON OF PRIORITY OF ADOP-
'fi<JX AND USE~ PLAINTIFFS ARE THE 
CO~I:\IOX LA 'V OWNERS IN UTAH 
C.OlrXTl"" 0~_, 'l"'HE 'l,RADEN A~IE ''MADE-
)lOISELLE'' AS APPLIES TO HAIR 
S'f\""LING SPRA 1"", COSMETICS AND TO 
IJE~-\l .. 'r\'" SALONS. SI~IILARLY BY REA-
SOX OF PRIORITY OF ADOPTION AND 
l .. SE IX A "SEPARATE MARKET," DE-
}1,EXD~-\X'l"' IS THE CO~I~ION-LAW OWN-
Ell IX ''rEBER COUNTY AND NORTH 
DA 'riS COlTX'fY OF THE NAME "MADE-
:\IOISELLE'' AS APPLIES TO BEAUTY 
S ..... -\ L 0 X S . . __ . ___ .. _ .... _ .___ . _ ._ .__ ... __ ....... _ ... _ .......... _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 7 
~-\. Acquisition of Basic Rights ------------------------··---- 8 
lTnited Drug Co. v-. Rectanus Co., 




Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 
240 us 403 ( 1916) --------------------------··---------- 8 
Sweet Sixteen Co. v. Sweet "16" Shop, 
15 F 2d 920 ( CCAS-1926) ----·-------·---····--·------- 8 
B. 'l~erritorial Considerations ··-·-----------------~------·-·--- 9 
1. Generally __ -·--·· --··---- ___ -- --·- ________ --·-···-------- _____ . 9 
Sweet Sixteen Co. v. Sweet "I6" Shop 
(Supra) ·····----····-·······----------·············--·------- 9 
E . 2. xcept1ons ----------·······-···---------····--····--·----------- 9 
Sweet Sixteen Co. v. Sweet "I6" Shop 
... (Supr~) -------····------·-····------------------------- 9, 13 
United Drug Co. v. Rectanus Co. 
(Supra) (cited) ----------····-··-···----------------- 9 
Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf 
(Supra) (cited) -----------·····--------···········----- IO 
3 Restatement of Torts Par. 7I7, 
comments (d), (e) ---·-···-----------------·-·······-· 10 
3 Restatement of Torts Sec 732 ---------------- IO 
' 3 ·Restatement of Torts Sec 732, · 
comment (a)· -------------------·-···-·---·-·-------------- II 
N atiorial Grocery Co. v. National Stores 
Corp., I23 A 7 40 --------------········---------- II, I.2 
'fhe Blue Bell Co. v. Frontier Refining Co. 
2I3 F 2d 355, 361 ( I954) ---·····--------.---------- 13 
· Eastern Outfitting Co. v. Manheim, et al 
IIO p 23 ----------------------------------------~------- I3, 14 
Kaufman v. Kaufman, Ill NE 691 
( I916) ---------------------------------------------·---- I4, I5 
Good Housekeeping Shop v. Smitten, et al. 
236 N''T 872 ---------------------------------------------- I4 
Nims, Unfair Competition and Trade 




Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
t,. ~ ature and Usc of )lark --···················--·---------- 15 
S\\·cet Sixteen l\>. Y. s,veet "16" Shop, 
(Supra) -·--··--··--·-······--·-·--·-·--·--·----·····--------- 15 
1). l~tl()\Vledge of l)laintifl"s x~une by Defendant 16 
s,,·eet Sixteen Co. Y. S\reet "16" Shop 
(Supra) ...................................................... 16 
E. Estoppel ··------------------·········-···---·······-------··---------- 16 
Hanover Star ~lilling Co. v. Metcalf ( s ll p 1" ~l ) •••. --•••• -. -•••.•••. --- --•• -•• -•••.••••••••••••••• --- 16 
I~~. Extension of J->Iaintiffs Rights 
"''I,hroughout Utah" ...................................... 17 
HanoYer Star nlilling Co. Y. Metcalf 
(Supra) ...................................................... 17 
3 Restatement of Torts, Sec. 732, 
Comment (a), supra ·········-····-····---·········· 17 
X ational Grocery Co. v. National Stores 
Corp., (Supra) -·-··--·-·-·-····-···------------------· 17 
Eastern Outfitting Co. v. Manheim, 
(Supra) ··-------------------·-·--·----·---·--·-·--··--·-····· 17 
l(auftnan v. Kaufman, (Supra) ............ 17 
Good Housekeeping Shop Y. Smitten, 
et al., (Supra) ----------·····----···-·············---··· 17 
G. Holdings of Other Courts -··---······--··············-··· 18 
II 
l"O)lPE'fiTIOX REMAINS THE ESS-
EXCE OF A TRADE)IARK, TRADEN AME, 
01~ lTXI~~AIR CO~IPETI'fiON SUI'l~ AT 
l'O:\l)IOX LA ''r. ------------------------------------------------------ 18 
Oppenhein1. ("ases on l"'"nfair Competition-Trade 
Regulations ( 1948) p. 10 ·------------------------------------------- 18 
111 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., 
137 F 2d 955, 959 CCA 2, 1953 ---------------------------- 18, 19 
Zlinkoff: Monopoly v. Competition: 53 Yale Law 
Journal 514, 528-552 ( 1944) ------------------------------------ 19 
National Grocery Co. v. National Stores Corp., 
supra ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ~() 
Eastern Outfitting Co. v. Manheim, et al., supra ____ 2() 
Kaufman v. Kaufman, supra -------------------------------- 20 
Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F 2d 972, 
973 ( CCA 2, 1928) ------------------------------------------------------ ~() 
Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden Condensed 
lVlilk Co., 201 F 2d 510, 514 ( CCA 7, 1912) ____________ 2() 
The Blue B_ell Co. v. Frontier Refining Co., 
supra _______ ... ______ . ____ ------------- _____ ----------------- ____ ---------_ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ ~ 1 
III 
PLAINTIFFS' PURPORTED U'fAH 
STA'fE REGI~'fRA'.fiON OF THE TRADE-
MARl{ OR TRADENAME ''MADEMOI-
SELLE" FOR BEAUTY SALON BUSINESS 
THROUGHOUT THE STATE OF UTAH 
IS I NV AL ID. --------------------------------------- ___ . ----------------- ~I 
Utah Code Annotated, 70-3-5, 70-3-2 -------------------- ~1 
Utah Code Annotated, 70-3-10, 70-3-15 ---------------- 22 
Utah Code Annotated, 70-3-3- ( 4), 70-3-2 ------------ 23 
Sweet Sixteen Co. v. Sweet "16" Shop, supra ______ 23 
IV 
DEFENDAN'l"' IS ENTITLED TO RE-
COVER HIS DAMAGES RESULTING 
FR0~1 FALSE ASSERTION OF WILLIAM 
GARTH SEEG~IILLER MADE TO PRO-
CURE TRADENAME REGISTRATION. ____ 24 




Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
\'.' l L L I .(\ ~1 G1\R'rH SEEG-
~Ill.JLEI\ and i\IARJORIE SEEG-
:\IILLER, dba ~l1\DJ1:~IOISEI.JL}~ 
B 1•: .. \.U'l'\~ SALON, or l\Ir\D~~ ~101-
SELLE SALONE OF, BEAlJ'fY, 
Plaintiffs-AppellantsJ 
vs . 






Sl'A'l'E)l~~N'l' OF N r\ TURE OF CASE 
'rhis is a case involving the common law of trade-
tnarks. tradenames, and unfair competition; and also 
the lTtah Statute applicable to trademarks and trade-
natnes (Title 70. Utah Code Annotated). 
Plaintiffs began using name "Mademoiselle -
Salon of Beauty" to identify a beauty salon in Provo, 
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Utah, in May, 1959, and became known in Utah County 
by that· name prior to June 2, 1961. (Stipulation R. 8) 
Defendant,. without knowledge of Plaintiffs' na1ne 
or use, began using name "Mademoiselle Coiffures" to 
identify his beauty salon in a wholly different geographic 
market, namely Ogden, Utah, about April 1, 1961, and 
became known by that name by many customers in 
'Veber County and North Davis County prior to June 
2, 1961. (Stipulation R. 8) 
Plaintiff, Wm. Garth Seeg1niller, with prior knowl-
edge of Defendant's use of name "Mademoiselle Coif-
fures" on June 2, 1961, applied to register his trademark 
with Secretary of State and verified that no one other 
than plaintiff had a right to use the name "lVIademoi-
selle" for a beauty salon "within the state of Utah." 
Based on said verification the Secretary of State issued 
a purported registration. 
Subsequently, Plaintiffs brought action to enjoin 
Defendant's use of "Mademoiselle" in its name, based 
on Plaintiffs' June 2, 1961, registration. Defendant 
counterclaimed for costs and damages, to set aside Plain-
tiffs' purported registration, and to restrain harassment 
by Plaintiffs. 
The trial court considered evidence as to registra-
tion and common-law rights of respective parties to use 
name "Mademoiselle," and required written briefs. 
On subsequent motion of Plaintiffs, after filing of 
briefs by each party, the court permitted Plaintiffs to 
reopen and present further evidence ('fr. 75-196). 
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... \fter trial \vithout jury the l'ourt found as facts 
that he<.'ause of ditf('rence in geographic "',.frade .~\.rea" 
there ,\.:ts no eon1petition or confusion; that defendant 
adopted its ruune \vithout kno,vledge of Plaintiffs' use 
or narne; that Defendant's use prior to June 2, 1961, 
lun·ing becorne established and not abandoned, Plaintiffs' 
suhsc<luent registration \vas invalid. The court denied 
relief to J>laintiffs, declared Plaintiffs' registration in-
,·:tlid, and ordered each party to pay its respective costs. 
ltELIEl1"' SOUGH'!, ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks affirmance of the judgment, ex-
cept that Defendant cross-appealed for reversal as to 
l)efendant paying its own costs; and seeks a ruling that 
I>Iaintifi's are responsible for costs and damages suffered 
by Defendant. l:>laintiffs seek reversal of entire judg-
ment. 
Plaintiffs con1n1enced operating a beauty salon in 
I>rovo, lTtah, in 1946 (,.l"'r. 28, 142) under name "Mar-
jorie's Salon of Beauty." On ~lay 23, 1959, Plaintiffs 
opened an additional shop in Provo using name "~Iade­
llloiselle- Salon of Beauty" (Tr. 9, 2~, Exhibit "J"). 
11'laintiffs assert extensive advertising coverage not 
sho,\·n by evidence ( Br. 3) . Plaintiffs' advertising 
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alleged to go northward beyond Utah County prior to 
June 2, 1961, was limited to a beauty show at ti1ne of 
opening in May, 1959, on KLOR T'T (Tr. 88, 159), 
and a radio ad on a 5000-watt station June 5, 1959 (Tr. 
26, Exhibit "L"). Plaintiffs' evidence (Exhibit "F ," 
addendum 2, prospectus 4) clearly establishes impossi-
bility of KLOR transmitting to Salt Lake City or 
Ogden, until later in June, 1959, when transmitter 
power was increased. This evidence was offered to show 
coverage May 23, 1959 (Tr. 159}. 
No evidence whatsoever was offered as to any circu-
lation of the Daily Herald of Provo beyond Utah 
County, ( Tr. 14, Exhibit "E"), and in any case only 
one ad is claimed, September 1959. Cancelled check to 
Daily Herald in summer, 1960, did not identify nature 
or date of service rendered (Exhibit "M," 'fr. 25), and 
was not offered in evidence. 
As to advertising in the "B.Y.U. Universe" the 
only ads were in nlid-1959 ('.fr. 14, 15), and the only 
evidence admitted by the court as to circulation limited 
circulation to current B.Y.U. students and local towns-
people ( Tr. 16). 
Plaintiffs' trade area for transactions under name 
''Mademoiselle'' did not extend northward beyond Salt 
Lake City and probably not beyond ·utah County on 
June 2, 1961. Plaintiffs were not known by that name 
to northern Utah customers on that date. (Tr. 89, 134, 
160-170). Only two customers were actually living north 
of Utah County on June 2, 1961. ('l"r. 93, 34). Leone 
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Boothe of Brigluun (, ity began going to )larjorie Seeg-
rniUer "·hile living in I>rovo 18 years ago, and still goes 
to her front tirue to tinte \vhile passing through Provo. 
und hns ~larjorie herself do her hair. (Tr. 92, 93). This 
goo<hrill \\'as long ago established 'vith ~larjorie person-
ally. and is not related or identified 'vith the tradename 
H~ladernoiselle.'' ('fr. U~). 'fhe other is Lettie B. Hust 
of ()gden ( 1 anyon ,,·ho works with ~Ir. Seegmiller daily 
at llercules Po,vder l .... o. in Salt Lake County, and whose 
trade has consisted solely of a few beauty product pur-
ehases bought fro1n and delivered personally to her by 
plaintiff in Salt Lake l,ounty ( Tr. 34, 76-79). Other 
alleged eustomers did not reside in northern Utah as 
early as J unc 2. 1961. ('l.,r. 89, 134, 160-170). Plaintiffs 
could identify no additional "customers" notwithstand-
illg a "cotnplete card file'' on all customers describing 
nan1e. address and service rendered ( Tr. 144) ; and not-
,,·ithstanding opportunity to reopen and present new 
evidence after trial briefs (Tr. 75). 
Defendant began using name "Mademoiselle Coif-
fures'' about ..:\pril 1, 1961 (Tr. 41), and has used it 
continuously to present tin1e (Tr. 39-47). Prior to 
.. :\pril 1. 1961, Defendant procured printed checks and 
other n1aterials and ordered sign (Exhibit 7, Tr. 40, 41). 
Defendant paid Ogden City for license April 12, 1961 
(Exhibit 10, 'fr. 51) and Defendant paid State of Utah 
for a license ... -\pril14, 1961 (Exhibit 9, Tr. 50). Defen-
dant opened for business May 19, 1961, accompanied 
by and preceeded by extensive newspaper and radio 
advertising (Exhibits 3, 4, 5, Tr. 42-46) . 
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Defendant becan1e known by the name "~Iadeinoi­
selle Coiffures" by many customers in Weber and north 
Davis Counties prior to June 2, 1961. (Stipulations R. 
8, No.5.) 
Defendant did not know of Plaintiffs' business at 
the time of adopting Defendant's name or at any other 
time prior to development of Defendant's good will and 
identification ( Tr. 41, 42, 51, 97, 184, 185, 186), and the 
trier of fact, the Court, has so held ( R. 12, 14) . Allega-
tions of plaintiffs to the contrary are not supported by 
evidence ( Tr. 41, 42, 51, 97, 184, 185, 186). 
No actual confusion between Plaintiffs and Defen-
dant has ever resulted. (Tr. 33} 
Plaintiffs have not contemplated a future expansion 
into Defendant's trade area (Tr. 176, 177). Plaintiffs 
have conducted no mail order business (Tr. 17, 79, 80, 
169), and certainly none prior to June 2, 1961. 
On June 2, 1961, Plaintiff, Wm. Garth Seegmiller, 
filed his affidavit with the Secretary of State, requesting 
a tra~ename registration (Exhibit 2). Such affidavit 
verified on oath that ". . . no other person has a right to 
use such trademark ... in the State of Utah" (Exhibit 
2). That at the time of such filing, and prior to June 2, 
1961, Plaintiffs knew of Defendant's business and use 
of the name "Mademoiselle" (Tr. 30, 73, 74, 75, 179, 
186). '"l,hat Plaintiff filed his affidavit specifically to 
interfere with Defendant's use of name "Mademoiselle" 
(Tr. 75). That the affidaYit '\\ras false in that defendant 
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bad previously bccoill<' identified by his trade n~une 
":\laderlloisellc l 1 oifl'ures·' in \\rebcr C'ounty and north 
l>a,·is l'ounty (Stipulation It. H, Xo. ;3) and the court 
so detcrrnined as a q ucstion of fact. ( 1{. 12, 14) 
'rite l'ourt found as facts that because of the differ-
elll'l' in Htrade areas" there \vas no competition or con-
fusion~ thnt Defendant adopted its name without knowl-
edge of lllaintiffs' use of name. 'l"hat Defendant's use 
prior to June 2, 1961, having become established and 
not abandoned, I>laintiffs' subsequent registration was 
invalid. (R. 12, 14) 
'l'he l'ourt denied Plaintiffs' petition and granted 
judgtnent to Defendant; except that the Court erred 
in ordering defendant to pay its own costs and from this 
decision, Defendant cross-appeals. 
ARGU~IENT 
I 
lry·· REASON O:F' PRIORITY OF ADOP-
'flt)X AXD lTSE, PLAINTIFFS ARE THE 
CO)l:\IOX LA ''r O''rNERS IN UTAH 
l.,OlTX'"fY OF THE 'fRADENAME "MADE-
)lOISELLE'' AS .t\.PPLIES TO HAIR S'fYL-
lXG SPR..:\ \T. C.OS)IETICS .L-\XD TO BEAUTY 
S..:\LOX S. SI)IIL.L-\RL Y BY REASON 0~_, 
I>J{IORITY OF ADOPTIO~ AND USE IN 
.\ "S}:J>..c-\.R~-\TE :\IARKET," DEFEXDANT 
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IS THE CO~IMON -LA \V 0\\rNER IN WEBER 
COUN'TY AND NOR'l"H DAVIS COUN'fi' 
OF THE NAME "1\lADEMOISELLE" AS 
APPLIES TO BEAUTY SALONS. 
A. Acquisitions of Basic Rights 
Plaintiffs and Defendant each contend that the 
basic law as to acquisition of common-law rights and 
geographical scope is set forth.in Hanover Star Milling 
Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, ( 1916), and United Drug 
Co. v. Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, ( 1918), and Sweet 
Sixteen Co. v. Sweet "16" Shop, 15 F 2d 920 (CCA 8, 
1926). 
The adoption by Defendant of the name "1\lade-
moiselle Coiffures" after proper licensing, and expend-
ing considerable sums in mass advertising, and without 
knowledge of Plaintiffs' use in a different trade area, 
and Defendant having become identified by that name 
in its "trade area" prior to June 2, 1961 (Stipulation 
R. 8, No. 5) , and having continued such use to the pres-
ent time, established a common-law right to the name 
in Defendant for Weber and north Davis Counties. 
"Undoubtedly, the general rule is that as be-
tween conflicting claimants to the right to use 
the same mark, priority of appropriation deter-
mines the question." 
United Drug Co. v. Rectanus Co. 
248 u s 90, 100 (1918) 
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B. 'l'erritorial t.:ousidcratJoHs 
1. (;enerally 
It is \\'ell re<.'ognized that such a right has territorial 
lintit~. 'l'hus. it ''"as held in the S\veet Sixteen case, citing 
\vith approval both the United Drug Co. and Ilanover 
~tar ~Iilling cases. that: 
"l\>nfessedly the general rule is that, 'vhile 
the first appropriator and user of a trademark 
O\vns such tnark . . . such protection will not be 
afforded as against a subsequent user and ap-
propriator. "·ho in good faith adopts and uses 
the tnark in a territory into which the goods of 
the first appropriator have not penetrated." 
s,veet Sixteen C'o. v. Sweet "16'' Shop, 
15 }_, 2<1 920, P. 923, (CCA 8, 1926) 
2. Exceptions 
'fhe court in that case went on (p. 924) to cite the 
t'vo exceptions to the a hove rule, namely: 
.. (a) llut 'vhere t\vo parties independently are 
etnploying the same mark upon goods of the same 
class. but in separate markets wholly remote the 
one frotn the other, the question of prior appro-
priation is legally insignificant, unless at least it 
appear that the second adopter has selected the 
tnark 'vith sotne design inimical to the interests 
of the first user. such as to take the benefit of 
the reputation of his goods, to forestall the ex-
tens ion of his trade, or the like." United Drug 
v. Rectanus, 2~8 lJ S 90, 101. 
·· (b) ,, ... e are not dealing with a case where the 
junior appropriator of a trademark is occupying 
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territory that would probably be reached by the 
prior user in the natural expansion of his trade, 
and need pass no judgment upon such a case." 
Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U S 
403, 420. 
Certainly the case at bar does not fall within "ex-
ception (a)," because the trier of fact has determined 
from the evidence that Defendant had no knowledge 
of Plaintiffs' use ( R. 12, 14) , so couldn't have had a 
"free ride" or use in mind inimical to best interests of 
Plaintiffs. 
What constitutes "separate markets" is a prime 
factor in determining these cases. Thus, 3 Restatement 
of Torts defined market in comments under Para. 717 as 
follows: 
"d. Limitation as to goods and market: 
One who has a trade mark or trade name does 
not have the exclusive right to use the designation 
even as a trade mark or trade name. He has the 
exclusive right only within 1nore or less restricted 
markets. . . . " ( p. 567) 
"e. Market. 
The noun "market" means, initially, the terri-
torial area in which goods are bought and sold, or 
the gathering of persons in such an area for the 
purpose of buying or selling goods .... " (p. 567) 
Subsequently in Para. 732 the Restate1nent says: 
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'l'he interest in a trade n1ark or trade natne is 
protel'ted. under the rule stated in 717, with refer-
ence onlv to 'l'erritorv from '\vhich he received or, 
\vith the. probable expansion of his business, may 
reasonnhly expect to receiYe custom in the busi-
ness in "·hich he uses his trade mark or trade 
ruune, and in territory in which a similar desig-
nation is used for the purpose of forestalling the 
expansion of his business. ( p. 604) 
"Comment a. 
'l'he territorial limits within which the right to 
exclusive use of a trade mark or trade name exists 
Ina v be narrower than the territorial limits of the 
la ,,; that creates the right. Since the right is 
created in order to avoid, or compensate for, 
harm caused by the tnarketing of one's goods or 
services as those of another, the right is limited 
to the territory in which such harm is likely .... 
In each case the issue is whether, in the territory 
in which the similar designation is used, there are 
or are likely to be a considerable number of pro-
spective purchasers of the goods or services in 
connection "·ith \vhich the trade mark or trade 
nan1e is used, \vho are likely to be misled by the 
sitnilarity. On this issue the good or bad faith of 
the alleged infringer is an important factor ... " 
(p. 604) 
'fhese sections emphasize the importance of the 
nu lllbcr of potentially 1nisled customers, and the bad 
faith of alleged infringer. 
'!'he National Grocery Co. case is a leading case 
defining "geographic market," and market of "future 
probable expansion'' tnentioned as exception (b) in the 
S\veet Sixteen case. In that case, two supermarket retail-
11 
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ers emphasized "National" in their respective natnes, 
their nearest stores being 25 miles apart in New Jersey. 
The State Court in 1924 refused to enjoin the latecomer 
saying: 
". . . 'fhe grievance is the single one already 
mentioned, namely, the use of the word which the 
complainant says it has pre-empted in the chain 
store business in the state of New Jersey as 
against the entire world .... Obviously, by force 
of the definition of the kind of business in which 
the parties are engaged, each store must draw its 
trade from a small surrounding territory .... " 
National Grocery Co. v. National Stores Cor-
poration, 123 A. 740, 740 (New Jersey). 
The Court continued: 
" ... Surely in the great majority of business 
enterprises, ... there is implied the hope, inten-
tion and design of constantly invading new terri-
tory .... It would be absurd to say that any such 
intention should permit the pre-empting of the 
use of the name at a place and time where such 
a supposed business enterprise had no customers 
or business, and therefore nothing to lose. It is 
entirely too remote and fanciful for the complain-
ant to object to another using a name in a certain 
locality, not because he has already established 
his trade there, but because he may do so in the 
future .... " (p. 743) 
The Court then distinguished cases reaching con-
trary result: 
" ... In all of the cases which the Vice Chancel-
lor used as precedents (Hilton Case) the out-
12 
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standing fact .... ,,·as the stealing by Defendant 
of contplainants custon1ers." ( p. 7 43) 
'fhe dictu111 of the l~ tah Supre1ne Court in the Blue 
Bell east.• ei les United Drug Co. Y. Rectanus, and then 
sets forth a sitnilar doctrine as Utah La'v in refusing 
to recognize tnarket of future expansion: 
··'rhe adoption of a trade mark does not project 
a right of protection in advance of the extension .. · 
of. or operate as a claim of territorial rights over 
areas into \\'hich it thereafter may be deemed de-
sirable to extend the trade." 
'l,he lllue Bell Co. v. Frontier Refining Co. 
213 F 2d 355, 361 (1954) (Utah) 
I>Iaintiff urges that the Sweet Sixteen Co. decision 
reaches a contrary conclusion. However, the court here 
1nerely found that the Plaintiff 'vas already in the 
1narket because of daily advertisements for some t\vo 
years in 7 5 different newspapers circulated daily in Salt 
Lake l'~ i ty, prior distribution of 1500 printed catalogs 
in lTtah, 6-8 Inail order sales, distribution of supple-
Inental pictures and drawings, negotiations for store 
lease. tuany actual cases of confusion, and telegraphic 
notification of the conflict four days prior to the regis-
tration: 
· · ... defendants assumed this name with full 
kno,vledge of its use by plaintiff ... " (p. 921) 
Results similar to those in the National Grocery 
l·ase. were reached by the '\r ashington Court in the East-
ern Outfitting case "~here Seattle and Spokane were 
held to constitute different markets: 
13 
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" . . . his protection is co-extensive \\'ith his 
market. 'The doctrine of unfair competition is 
based upon the principle of common busines~ 
integrity, and equity only affords relief lvhen this 
principle has been violated .... The mischief 
''T hich a court of equity \vill guard against is a 
confusion in names or in the identity of the par-
ties or in the goods sold so as to deceive the public 
and work a fraud upon the party having a right 
to the trade name. There cannot be unfair trade 
competition unless there is competition." 
Eastern Outfitting Co. v. Manheim, et. al. 
110 p. 23,24 (Washington) 
The Massachusetts Court found that various stores 
as close as sixteen miles apart were in different trade 
areas: 
"The trade name and symbols of the plaintiff 
cannot extend into regions where his goods are 
not sold, where he has no customers, and "'here 
he has no trade. There can be no recovery unless 
it appears that there has been a wrongful approp-
riation by defendant. . . . Actual or probable 
deception of the public . . . is the basis of the 
action. 'There can be no unfair competition unless 
plaintiff is in fact a rival for the trade which 
defendant secures." 
Kaufman v. Kaufman 
Ill NE 691, 692, (1916) (Massachusetts) 
See also Good Housekeeping Shop v. Smit-
ten, et. al. 
236 N''r 872 (Michigan) 
Nims points out that the determination of geo-
graphic boundaries of protection is a question of fact 
rather than law. 
14 
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"\ rhile the concept of good-\vill has becoine less 
t•loscly confined territorially, it still has bounda-
rit's, and even under tnodern doctrine it is neces-
sary that there be evidence of its existence to 
\raiTant its protection. Its extent is a question of 
faet rather than of la\v." 
~ ims, l T nfair Competition and '11rade 
J/ arksJ 4th Ed., Sec. 35 (a), p. 150 
In the Kauftnan case the court said: 
''It does not seen1 easy to infer that 1nen would 
travel sixteen to seventy-three miles ... for a 
hat." ( p. 692) 
Sinularly in the case at bar, not only is evidence 
of existing confusion or competition lacking but it is 
difficult to infer that wo1nen in the future would travel 
164 1niles round trip from Ogden to Provo for a hairdo. 
l". X atu1·e and Use of ~lark 
Plaintiff attempts to draw distinction on basis of 
"'fechnical trade n1ark" as opposed to common-law 
Inark. However, the court in the Sweet Sixteen case 
stated the accepted rule: 
··It is \veil settled that, both in cases of unfair 
co1npetition unaccompanied with trade mark in-
fringeinent, and in cases of infringement of tech-
nical or common-law trade marks, the essence of 
the ,,·rang consists in the sale or mistaking of 
goods of one dealer or manufacturer for those of 
another." ( P. 9:25). 
Defendant denies any penetration by Plaintiff into 
Davis or \\'eber Counties prior to critical date of June 
:!, 1961 ('fr. 89, 13~, 160-170). There was no confusion 
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or competition in fact ( Tr. 80, 81, 93, 135). Neither \\'as 
there any evidence of "free ride" or "palming off." 
D. Knowledge of Plaintiffs' N arne by Defendant 
In the present case Defendant did not know of 
Plaintiffs' existence at time of adoption of Defendant's 
name ( Tr. 41, 42, 51, 97, 184, 185, 186) or subsequently 
until after good will and "Secondary Meaning" were 
established. 'The Court, as trier of fact, so determined. 
(R. 12, 14) 
The court in the Sweet Sixteen case clearly found 
that defendant had actual notice of plaintiff four days 
before registration issued. (p. 921) It should also be 
noted that Defendant in the Sweet Sixteen case had not 
established any good will or secondary meaning in the 
name prior to Plaintiffs' entering the "market." 
E. Estoppel 
Although the doctrine of estoppel might properly 
be urged, it is not essential to Defendant's case. 
Although Plaintiffs might have registered their 
name as early as 1959, and pre-empted the entire state, 
they failed to do so. 'l"hey should be estopped on theory 
of Hanover Star Milling case from asserting their un-
protected claim after defendant has developed "Secon-
dary Meaning" and "good will" at substantial expense: 
" ... they must be held to have taken the risk 
that some innocent party 1night ... hit upon the 
same mark and expend money and effort in build-
ing up a trade. . . . And when it appears, as it 
16 
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does, that Ilano,·er Cotnpany in good faith, and 
\rithout notice ... bus expended much n1oney 
and effort in building up its trade ... Allen & 
\ \rheeler C,on1pany is estopped to assert trade 
1nnrk infringement as to that territory.'' (p. 419) 
1~,. Extension of Plaintiffs' Rights ""Throughout 
Utah'' 
I>Iaintiffs admit that the rule that cormnon-law 
rights are co-extensive 'vith state boundaries was criti-
cized by the tnajority opinion (p. 416) in the Hanover 
l'ase ... and has not been generally regarded with favor 
hy scholars in the field of trademark la"··" ( Pl. Br. 12) 
See also: 
a llestaten1ent of ,.l,or, Sec. 732, Cotnrnent 
a., supra. 
X ational Grocery Co. v. National Stores 
l"orp., supra. 
Eastern Outfitting Co. v. Manheim, et. al., 
supra. 
l~auf1nan ,~. Kaufman, supra. 
Good Housekeeping Shop Y. Smitten, et. al., 
supra. 
'!'he facts of the case at bar show no competition 
or confusion between Plaintiffs and Defendant north 
of Salt Lake County on June 2, 1961, and substantially 
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G. I-Ioldings of Other Courts 
Cases cited by Plaintiffs as broadening territorial 
rights are distinguishable either on basis of intentional 
appropriation for free ride, bad fait~ of the lateco1ner. 
or deception of public due to actual confusion of source. 
II 
COMPE,-fiTION REMAINS TilE ES-
SENCE OF A TRADEMARK, TRADENAME 
OR UNFAIR COMPETITION SUIT A1, 
COMMON LAW. 
Although some courts have used language suggest-
ing competition is no longer necessary, such is not the 
law of the land. 
Laws of "Unfair Competition," common la"T and 
statutory, were designed to free competition from ab-
uses, still recognizing that: "Liberty to compete should 
J guarantee the rewards to those who could survive by 
reason of economic fitness and superior merit in produc-
tive and selling efficiency." 
Oppenheim, Cases on Unfair Co1npetition-'Trade 
Regulation ( 1948 Ed.), p. 10 
See Defendants Trial Court Brief, p. 8-9, for his-
torical summary. 
In the Eastern 'Vine Corp. case, Judge F.,rank 
succinctly states the law: 
18 
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··'rhe failure to keep constantly in 1nind the 
divers poliey t·onsiderations ... and the conse-
<t uen t oceasional over-e1nphasis on but one of 
the1n- the protection of the interest of the busi-
nesstnnn 'vho has built a business around a name 
-has someti1nes led to decisions unduly extend-
ing the confines of name-monopolies. For a time 
the courts were remarkably generous in fixing the 
boundaries of such monopolies. Today the ten-
dcnclJ is to be somewhat less generous . ... We 
approach the case at barJ thenJ having in mind 
the basic com1non-law policy of encouraging com-
petition and the fact the protection of monopolies 
in names is but a secondary and limiting factor.n 
Eastern ''rine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, 
Ltd. 
137 ~_, 2d 955, 959 (CCA 2d, 1953) 
Cert. Denied; 320 US 758 
~,or critical analysis of opinions see Zlinkoff: Mon-
olopy ,~. Competition: 53 Yale Law Journal 514, 528-
552 (1944). Zlinkoff says in 53 Yale Law Journal: 
''The trend of decisions within this field . . . in 
contrast to that prevailing in a previous period-
has unmistakable been moving toward restricting 
the scope of exclusive rights awarded plaintiffs 
and corresponding broadening the privileges of 
their competitors." ( p. 531) . 
Zlinkoff also attacks the more liberal expressions 
of ("allman, as not reflecting the law: 
, .... decisional trends have not been influenced 
by writers like Callman because, in their advocacy 
of greater recognition of exclusive rights in 
tnarks ... they have overlooked the interests of 
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the public, and the view that free competition best 
advances those interests." (p. 529) 
Similarly, in the National Grocery Co. case the 
court said: 
"Of course, their must be actual competition 
before there can be any unfair competition." 
(p. 7 4) 
Similar law is pronounced in Eastern Outfitting 
Co. case (p. 24), and Kaufman case (p. 692) quoted 
previously. 
Although Judge Learned Hand has been often 
quoted as authority for decisions not relying on "coni-
petition," he has on several occasions noted that irrespec-
tive of the language used, the essential element remains 
competition: 
''The law of unfair trade comes down very 
nearly to this - as judges have repeated again 
and again- that one merchant shall not divert 
customers from another by representing what he 
sells as emanating from the second. This has been, 
and perhaps even more now is, the whole Law 
and the Prophets on the subject, though it as-
. '' sumes many guises. 
Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson 
26 F 2d 972, 973 ( CCA 2, 1928) 
See also: 
Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden Condensed 
Milk Co. 
201 F 2d 510, 514 (CCA 7, 1912) 
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'1,1 l 44 • ff " "f 'd ,, 
. 1crc l'all Jc no pass1ng o , ree-r1 e, or con-
fusion ot' source except in the area of 4 \cotnpetitive busi-
ness. 
l~ertninly the Utah Supren1e Court recognized this 
in its decision in the Blue 13ell cases in refusing to recog-
nize Hn1nrket of future expansion." (p. 361) 
Ill 
J>J~i\l~'riFFS' l~URPOR'fED U'fAH 
S'f.i\'fE It~:GIS'l,RATION 0}, THE TR..t\.DE-
~1 .i\ It I~ Oll 'l,RADEN AME "4MADEMOI-
s~:LLE" FOl-t BEALTTY SALON BUSINESS 
'rHROlT(~HOTJ'l, '1'HE S'f .. c\.TE OF U'l,AH IS 
IX\"ALID. 
Ad1nittedly, the Utah act provides that Registra-
tion ... shall constitute prima-facie evidence of exclusive 
o\vnership ( lTtah Code Annotated, 70-3-5). 
Defendant clearly overcame Plaintiffs' "prima 
facie" ease for exclusive ownership. (R. 8, 12, 14, Tr. 
41-46) 
lTtah Code Annotated, Section 70-3-2 forbids regis-
tration of a 1nark "used in this state by another and not 
abandoned": 
h70-:J-:?: 1'rade Jl arks and Service Marks not to 
be Registered JVhen: A trade mark or service 
Inark shall not be registered if it ... 
21 
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6. Consists of or comprises a trade mark or 
service mark registered in this state or a trade 
mark, trade name or service mark previously 
used in this state by another and not abandoned 
as to be likely when applied to the goods and serv-
ices of the applicant to cause confusion or mistake 
d d . '' an to ece1ve. . . . 
The evidence clearly shows that Defendant's use 
was previous to this purported registration and had not 
been abandoned. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 70-3-10 provides 
for cancellation if found: 
"2.b. That the registrant is not the owner of the 
trade mark or service mark. 
c. That the registration was granted im-
properly. 
3. When a court of competent jurisdiction shall 
order cancellation of a registration on any 
d " groun . 
'l.,he evidence clearly shows not only that the Regis-
trant was not the owner of the trade name in ''T eber 
County or North Davis County (R. 8, 12, 14, Tr. 41-46), 
but that he knew of Defendant's use of the name at the 
time of filing for registration (Tr. 30, 73, 74, 75, 179, 
186). 
Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 70-3-15 provides: 
"Common-law trade marks or service marks-
Nothing herein shall adversely affect the rights 
and the enforcement of rights in trade marks or 
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Defendant's common-law rights were acquired in 
good faith in a trade area not cormnon to Plaintiffs on 
June 2. 1961, and prior to Plaintiffs' registration ( R. 
8, 1:?. 1~, 'fr. 41, -1:2,51, 97, 185). 
Bused upon the conceded facts, the only argument 
to controvert Defendant's common-law right prior to 
.June 2, 1961, is based upon "prior use" by Plaintiffs. 
Such argument must fail because of the difference in 
"trade area" previously discussed. 
Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 70-3-3- ( 4) requires 
a registration affidavit verified by applicant including 
among other things: 
H ( 4) A statement that the applicant is the owner 
of the trade 1nark or service mark and that no 
other person has the 1·ight to use such trade mark 
or service mark either in the identical form there-
of or in such near resemblance thereto as might 
be calculated to deceive or to be mistaken there-
fore in this state.n 
Existence of Secondary Meaning and right of user 
established by Defendant in Weber and north Davis 
Counties prior to June 2, 1961 (R. 8, 12, 14) necessarily 
renders affidavit required of Plaintiffs as condition pre-
cedent to regist1·ation "false," thus invalidating any pur-
ported registration per Section 70-3-2-6, supra. 
Thus the court in the Sweet Sixteen case set aside 
defendant's l~tah State Registration on basis of prior 
conunon-lu"~ rights of Plaintiff. (p. 921, 925) 
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The requirement of accurate affidavit is the ,·ery 
graveman of gaining rights under Section 70, '"hich 
permits registration on affidavit alone, without notice, 
advertisements, proof or other process. Certainly, a 
Plaintiff with unclean hands, knowing of Defendant's 
use of the name, and intending to deprive Defendant 
of such value as Defendant has created, may not falsely 
aver exclusive ownership and right "within the State of 
Utah," and thereby gain a right or priority not available 
without such registration. 
IV 
DEFENDAN'l' IS ENTI'l'LED '1'0 RE-
COVER HIS DAMAGES RESUL'l'ING FROl\1 
FALSE ASSERTION OF WILLIAM GARTH 
SEEGMILLER MADE TO PROCURE 
TRADENAME REGISTRATION. 
Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 70-3-12, provides: 
"70-3-12: False or fraudtttlenJ reproduction or 
declarat~on in registration - Liability for dam-
ages: Any~person who shall for himself or on 
behalf of any other person procure the filing and 
registration of any trade mark or service mark in 
the office of the secretary of state under the pro-
visions hereof by knowingly making any false 
or fraudulent representation or declaration, verb-
ally or in writing or by any other fraudulent 
means, shall be liable to pay all damages sus-
tained in consequency of such filing or registra-
tion, to be recovered by or on behalf of the party 
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iujurcd thereby iu any court of competent juris-
diction.'' 
l,laintiil's' atl'idaYit for registration verifies that: 
· · ... no other person has the right to use such 
trade 1nark or service mark ... in this state." 
(Exhibit~) 
Such affidavit "·as made by Plaintiff with knowl-
edge of l)efendant's use and name ( Tr. 30, 73, 7 ~, 75, 
17H. 18{)). Such state1nent '"as "false" because of Defen-
dant's established conunon-law trade name in the trade 
area of \\r eber and north Davis Counties at the ti1ne 
of the affidavit (R. 8, 12, I~). Such false statement was 
n1ade for the a<hnitted purpose of interfering with De-
fendant's business use of the name ''Mademoiselle" 
('l'r. 7.>). 'fhe false statement and subsequent improper 
registration did in fact result in damage to Defendant 
in that he has been required to retain counsel to resist 
this action and set aside the purported registration. 
Plaintiff, consequently should be required to pay all 
l'osts and datnages sustair1ed by Defendant. 
In all othe1· respects the judgment and findings of 
the trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectively submitted, 
\\rALLACE R. WOODBCRY 
711 East on South Temple 
Salt Lake City. Utah 
EM ~-4321 
.... -\.ttorney for Defendant-Respondent 
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